RHI: How did we get here?
November 2012: Scheme launches
The non-domestic Renewable Heat Incentive scheme was announced in November 2012 by the then Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Investment Arlene Foster. The scheme’s aim was to encourage businesses to be more environmentally friendly. Great Britain introduced a similar scheme in 2011.
August 2013: Whistle-blower concerns
Less than a year later, a whistle-blower businesswoman Janette O’Hagan made a number of attempts to warn politicians and civil servants the incentive was perverse and had no cost controls, which the GB scheme did have.
Despite the warnings DETI launched the domestic RHI scheme in 2014, extending the incentive to households.
2015: Spike in applications
In January 2015, DETI also failed to seek re-approval for the scheme from the Department of Finance.
By September, DETI officials had realised the need for cost controls and announced that tiered tariffs were to be introduced. This sparked a spike in applications for the more lucrative old scheme before the changes were made.
2016: Another whistle-blower and closure of the scheme
By January 2016, another whistle-blower wrote a letter addressed to the First and Deputy First Ministers claiming that – in one case – a farmer was set to collect £1 million for heating an empty shed.
The following month, the Renewable Heat Incentive scheme was closed to new applications by the then-Enterprise Minister Jonathan Bell.
Summer 2016: Audit report published
In July, the Audit Office published its report on the scheme. It said RHI had created a "very serious ongoing impact on the Northern Ireland budget".
The report estimated the scheme would cost Northern Ireland around £1 billion over 20 years.
December 2016: Scandal breaks
A BBC current affairs programme revealed that another whistle-blower had contacted the First Minister as early as 2013 raising concerns about the scheme.
The First Minister Arlene Foster was in China at the time and told UTV that she did nothing wrong and had passed on whistle-blower concerns to officials. A week later, she vowed to stay put to sort out the financial mess.
This came as former DETI Minister Jonathan Bell told the BBC’s Stephen Nolan that Arlene Foster’s advisers had attempted to remove her name from documents linked to RHI during his time in office.
Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness called on Arlene Foster to resign. She refused.
January 2017: Political fallout and inquiry ordered
Martin McGuiness announced he was standing down as Deputy First Minister on 9 January 2017.
With Sinn Féin refusing to nominate a successor for Martin McGuinness within a week of his resignation, then-Secretary of State James Brokenshire announced that Northern Ireland electorate would go to the polls in March.
Over the following days, it was revealed that a number of relations of Assembly members and special advisors were beneficiaries of the RHI scheme.
Dr Andrew Crawford, a former DETI SPAD under Arlene Foster, resigned amid claims that he exerted pressure to keep the botched scheme open – an allegation which he has repeatedly denied.
Before Stormont’s collapse, then-Finance Minister Máirtín Ó Muilleoir ordered the public inquiry into the RHI scheme.
March 2017: Court orders and elections
With growing public interest and demand for information, a court ruled that companies receiving RHI subsidies could be published.
That week also saw the Assembly election take place and unionism lose its majority at Stormont. While the DUP remained the largest party in Northern Ireland, its number of MLAs dropped from 38 to 28 – just one more than Sinn Féin.
April 2017: Reduced tariffs and the beginning of the Inquiry
A substantially reduced subsidy was introduced on 1 April and as a result, the Renewable Heat Association (RHANI) – a group that represents hundreds of boiler owners – claimed that many of its members were facing financial difficulties.
Sir Patrick Coughlin, chairman of the Inquiry, introduced his panel team and outlined how he would gather evidence surrounding the scandal at a preliminary hearing in Stormont.
November 2017 – October 2018: The RHI Inquiry
The Inquiry served close to 700 notices requiring the production of documents and witness statements and gathered more than one million pages of evidence.
Over the course of 114 days of hearings between November 2017 and December 2018, the panel heard a number of revelations, including how Arlene Foster didn’t read the legislation which established the scheme – and that she feels no personal responsibility for the botched scheme despite being the Minister in charge of it for most of its existence.
It uncovered that it took civil servants three and a half years to discover what the renewable energy industry figured out within four weeks of the scheme’s launch – that claimants could get “cash for ash”.
The inquiry also revealed that at least one DUP SPAD thought that, as the scheme was getting out of control and going vastly over budget, that the overspend bill would be picked up by Westminster.
The inquiry closed with a warning from Sir Patrick Coghlin that a number of individuals and organisations are likely to face significant criticism in his final report.
March 2019: Tariffs cut for boiler owners
Former NI Secretary Karen Bradley fast-tracked legislation through Westminster in March 2019 that would see average payments to boiler owners fall again, from an average of £13,000 a year to around £2,000.
The tariff cuts are being challenged in court by a poultry farmer however the case has been delayed until after the RHI Inquiry publishes its report.
2020: Devolution restored and RHI report date confirmed
As efforts to restore Stormont continued in January 2020, the UK and Irish governments published a draft deal called ‘New Decade, New Approach’. Within days, the five main parties had accepted the deal and went about forming an Executive.
It was then confirmed that the report into the botched RHI scheme would be published on 13th March.