Fire service 'outside of loop' during Manchester terror attack response
A major report into the Manchester Arena terror attack states it cannot say if a two-hour delay in deploying firefighters might have saved lives.
The fire service was effectively "outside of the loop" of police and ambulance emergency responders - the report found.
It meant that firefighters, some who heard the bomb go off, and were trained in first-aid and terror scenarios with specialist equipment, did not get permission to go to the scene until hours after the suicide bombing, despite being stationed half a mile away.
"Strategic oversights" by police commanders led to confusion over whether an active shooter was on the loose and poor communications between Greater Manchester Police and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service meant fire crews only arrived two hours and six minutes after the bombing - which left 22 people dead and scores more injured.
The 226-page report by Lord Bob Kerslake was commissioned by Andy Burnham, the mayor of Greater Manchester, to assess the preparedness and emergency response to the attack last year.
The report makes 50 recommendations but states its panel of experts was not to answer the question of whether earlier arrival at the scene by firefighters would have made a difference to the medical outcome of the injured.
However, the report notes that firefighters "would have been much better placed to support and, potentially, to accelerate the evacuation of casualties from the foyer," if they had gone to the scene.
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THE ATTACK: HOW EVENTS UNFOLDED
The police duty inspector in the GMP force control room declared Operation Plato, a pre-arranged plan when it is suspected a marauding armed terrorist may be on the loose - and assumed, wrongly, other agencies were aware.
But he was praised for taking one of the most crucial "life or death" decisions of the night, a "key use of discretion" to override the rules and allow paramedics and police to continue treating the injured even though they may be in danger of further attacks.
By the time the fire and ambulance services were informed, Operation Plato was effectively put on "stand by" as it emerged the attack was from a single suicide bomber and not the prelude to further armed attacks.
FIRE SERVICE RESPONSE
The senior fire officer on duty, a National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer, stuck to rules which dictate keeping emergency responders 500 metres away from any suspected "hot" zone of danger from a potential armed terrorist.
It was "fortuitous" the NWAS were not informed - otherwise they may have pulled out their paramedics, the report stated and instead they stayed and "lives were saved".
As the fire officer could not get through on the phone to the police force duty officer, the response of the fire service was "brought to the point of paralysis" to the "immense frustration on the firefighters faces".
Instead of rushing to the scene to help, fire crews and a Special Response Team, trained to deal with terrorist incidents, rendezvoused at fire station outside the city centre.
And while a joint strategic co-ordinating group of emergency response services and others gathered at GMP HQ in east Manchester, GMFRS chief fire officer Peter O'Reilly, who has now retired, focused his senior officers at their own HQ in Salford, which played a "key role" in delaying the response further.
The report says it hopes, in future, different services control rooms not being able to properly pass critical information between them "will never happen again."