Grenfell Tower final report: Who are some of the inquiry’s core participants?

A “spider’s web of blame” was spun as organisations sought to point to others as being at fault over the 2017 fire, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard.

Lead counsel Richard Millett KC described how a “merry−go−round of buck−passing” had prevailed throughout the hearings.

Here is a look at some of the main core participants in the inquiry:

– Kingspan

The company has said its K15 insulation product made up 5% of the insulation in the tower block and was used without its knowledge.

It has also stressed the exterior cladding, which it did not manufacture, was deemed by the inquiry to be the “principal reason” for how quickly the fire spread.

Former housing secretary Michael Gove has previously accused Kingspan of having done “nothing to contribute financially to the remediation costs required to fix unsafe buildings”.

The firm insists it has “actively engaged in all remediation inquiries received to date and has publicly committed to pay its share of remediation costs in circumstances where it is responsible for the inappropriate use of K15 in buildings, and its safe retention cannot be supported by testing”.

– Celotex

Celotex was the manufacturer of the majority of the insulation boards used in the refurbishment.

Its Rs5000 was one of the insulation components used in the Grenfell Tower rainscreen cladding system and its TB4000 insulation was used to fill gaps in the window surrounds during the refurbishment of the tower.

During the inquiry, Celotex employees faced questions about the manipulation of a fire safety test to secure a pass for its combustible Rs5000 product for use on high-rise buildings.

In a previous statement, the firm said during its investigations after the fire “certain issues emerged concerning the testing, certification and marketing of Celotex’s products” which involved “unacceptable conduct on the part of a number of employees”.

It added: “They should not have happened and Celotex has taken concerted steps to ensure that no such issues reoccur.”

– Arconic

Arconic supplied the Reynobond 55 cladding panels with a polyethylene (PE) core that were used in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower and were later found to have fuelled the blaze.

The phase one report in 2019 concluded the “principal reason” the flames shot up the building at such speed was the combustible cladding which acted as a “source of fuel”.

A lawyer for the cladding giant told the phase two inquiry it would be “wrong and unfair” to pin the blame for the fire on the company, arguing its product was used in a “wholly unorthodox and irregular cladding system” on the tower, for which the firm “bore no responsibility”.

He said the second phase had seen evidence presented which meant the first phase conclusion could now be placed in a “far wider” and “more accurate” context, suggesting the fire resulted “not from the use of ACM (aluminium composite material) PE but from the way in which it was used … in combination with a wide range of other combustible materials”.

– Rydon

Rydon was appointed in 2014 as the design and build contractor for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower.

It has stressed it did not design or specify the cladding or insulation, and told the inquiry it had “engaged, in good faith” already-appointed architects to ensure the design complied with building regulations and engaged a specialist cladding subcontractor “to design and install compliant and safe material”.

The firm argued that while its “position in the contractual chain makes it a focus of attention”, it cannot “be blamed for the dishonest behaviour of Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan” around the use of “their unsafe and dangerous products at Grenfell tower”.

– Exova

Exova provided fire safety advice to Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) for the proposed tower refurbishment.

A lawyer for the fire safety consultants told the inquiry the company was later “frozen out” of the project and Rydon, the firm that became the main contractor in 2014, had “consciously and deliberately” chosen not to appoint Exova as part of the design team.

Exova said it was not part of the process of selecting the cladding and was not responsible for designing, installing or approving the system.

– Whirlpool Corporation

Whirlpool Corporation was the manufacturer of the fridge-freezer where, as confirmed in the first report, the fire started.

Inquiry chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick said that while a fire starting in an electrical domestic appliance is not uncommon, “the important question” to consider is how that “could have had such catastrophic consequences for the whole building and its occupants”.

In his first report, he stated: “What really matters is that the design of the refurbishment, the choice of materials and the manner of construction allowed an ordinary kitchen fire to escape into the cladding with disastrous consequences.”

– RBKC

The leader of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) council has previously said she believes the council has been “the most honest and open of any of the defendants” in the inquiry.

But Elizabeth Campbell said she accepts the council “should have done more to keep our residents safe before the fire, and to care for them in the aftermath”.

In a statement issued just days ahead of the report’s publication, she said: “We know the report will be a hugely significant moment for the bereaved, survivors and the community.

“I will make sure that it is a hugely significant moment for this council too. We will look hard at the recommendations and what we need to do so we continue to become a better organisation as a lasting legacy from the tragedy.”

– KCTMO

Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) was appointed by RBKC to run its council housing stock.

In February 2018, less than a year after the fire, KCTMO handed back delivery of all day-to-day housing and related support services to the the council.

The phase one report found the TMO emergency plan was some 15 years out of date, with information about the tower failing to reflect changes to the building from the 2016 refurbishment, including not having the right number of flats and having inaccurate and out-of-date details of the numbers of vulnerable residents who would need assistance for emergency evacuation.

Tower resident Edward Daffarn, who had previously raised safety concerns and predicted a “catastrophic event” at the tower seven months before the fire, told the inquiry the TMO had acted like “a mini-mafia” towards residents.

He said he had never believed the KCTMO was capable of keeping tenants safe, claiming staff at the organisation believed residents should be grateful to them and had labelled him a “troublemaker”.

– LFB

The first report concluded that the London Fire Brigade’s (LFB) performance “fell below the standards set by its own policies or national guidance”, with “justified concern” that the organisation had failed to learn from previous disasters such as the Lakanal House fire in 2009 in which six people were killed.

The phase one report said the stay-put policy was not questioned soon enough and recommended policies must be developed for managing a transition from “stay put” to “get out”, and that control-room staff should receive training on handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers.

In March this year, LFB said it had completed all recommendations made to it by the first stage of the inquiry, including changed training to firefighters to recognise when a building might be failing and, “at the earliest point”, lead an emergency evacuation to save lives.

The Fire Brigades Union has said the fire “was a crime caused by deregulation and institutional failings at the highest level”, claiming frontline firefighters had not been appropriately warned about compartmentation breaking down because of flammable cladding.

– Government

The Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities – which was this year renamed the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government – told the phase two inquiry it “apologises unreservedly” for its failure to recognise weaknesses in the regulatory system and for a failure to ensure effective oversight of the regulatory and compliance regime.

It insisted it is committed to “driving change” and referenced the Fire Safety Act 2021 and the Building Safety Act 2022, which it said “bring about lasting changes to overhaul a regulatory system that has been shown to have been unfit for purpose”.

There has been repeated criticism from bereaved and survivor groups at recommendations not being implemented by Government – namely that the owners and managers of high-rise residential buildings be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans (Peeps) for residents unable to self-evacuate.

Following a consultation, the Government said in 2022 that, despite widespread support for Peeps, there remained what it described as significant barriers to implementing them, on the grounds of proportionality, practicality, and safety.

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