Who is responsible for the Summerland disaster as it marks its 50th anniversary?

The Summerland disaster is regarded as the Isle of Man's greatest tragedy - but who was responsible?

A total of 50 people died and 80 more were seriously injured after a fire spread through a leisure centre on 2 August 1973.

The conclusion of a public inquiry marked the event as 'death by misadventure', but many of the survivors want this overturned.

A public inquiry, titled 'The Summerland Fire Commission' (SFC), was released in May 1974.

Who were the main parties involved?

Douglas Corporation owned the land Summerland was built on, and the facility was leased out to someone who would manage it and complete the internal fittings.

The principal architect was local man, James Lomas, with Leeds firm Gillinson Barnett as the associate architects and Alan Theaker as the senior project architect. Trusthouse Forte were contracted to run the building.

How did the fire start?

The fire was sparked by three young boys from Liverpool who were smoking in a small disused kiosk at around 7:30pm.

A discarded cigarette caused the kiosk to catch fire, which then fell against the wall, which in turn set alight and the fire spread to the internal wall.

What role did the Architects play?

The inquiry found the primary cause of the blaze was non-fire resistant materials within the building of Summerland.

Galbestos, a flammable material, covered the lower levels, Oroglas panels were on the upper levels and behind the Galbestos, was an internal wall of combustible plastic-coated Decalin.

As the fire spread inside, it met the Oroglas which began melting with molten plastic, burning people below - the roof burnt out in around 10 minutes.

Discussing the disaster in parliament, Justin Madders, the MP for Ellesmere Port and Neston, said: "The architects of Summerland had opted to use Galbestos in its construction.

"Galbestos is a plastic-coated metal cladding with limited fire resistance and, in combination with the use of decalin, which burns rapidly, for the internal walls, created the perfect cocktail for a disaster.

"The fire broke through the highly combustible surface and burned undetected for a whole 10 minutes before bursting into the ground floor of the leisure building, igniting the Oroglas acrylic panels used on the walls and roof.

"The open-plan design aided the spread of the fire, with the internal spaces acting as chimneys to spread the fire.

"The terror that those in the building must have felt is unthinkable; survivors described mass panic, with the building appearing to melt before their eyes."

The SFC concluded the architects made a number of errors which led to the tragedy, but 'no villains' were singled out.

There was also no evidence to suggest the architects had considered fire precautions or any means of escape during the building process.

What did building management do?

The inquiry found that no fire alarm sounded when Summerland was engulfed in flames and some of the fire escapes were locked - leading to a major delay in the evacuation.

One of the firefighters who was first on the scene, said the staff were trying to put the fire out for half an hour before the service was called, and those in the control room did not know what they were doing.

What have the Government done?

The inquiry also highlighted that the Isle of Man's fire regulations had been waived, stating that "the external walls of any building shall be non-combustible throughout and have a fire resistance of two hours".

But the report claimed that "neither Oroglas nor Colour Galbestos complied with these rules". 

What were the 'Factors in the Loss of Life' according to the inquiry?

• Organisation of evacuation procedures

• Action taken by members of Summerland staff

• Availability and use of fire alarm systems

• Defects in the means of escape

• Principles of means of escape

• Escape distances and unites of exit width

• Seperation of children from parents

• Exit from Solarium floor

• Obstruction of exits

• Inadequacy of exit and directional signs

• North-east service stairway - lack of proper protection

• Failure of emergency lighting systems

What do survivors want for the future?

In the run up to the 50th anniversary the Chief Minister made a public apology for the first time since the disaster.

But the campaign group, 'Apologise for Summerland', says it does not go far enough, and is asking for three things to be addressed by the government:

• A public apology for the "disregard for basic fire safety in favour of saving money and speedy construction".

• A public apology for "the pain and suffering for the last 50 years".

• A public admission that the death by misadventure verdict given to those who died was 'inappropriate'.

No criminal charges have ever been brought, and 34 recommendations were made in relation to building regulations.