What have we learnt from the three Manchester Arena Inquiry reports?

After three and a half years the independent public inquiry investigating the deaths of the victims of the Manchester Arena terror attack in 2017 has concluded.

It was established to allow a "full, fair and fearless" investigation into the terror attack.

Opening the inquiry in September 2020, chair Sir John Saunders said it was, "an exercise in establishing the truth."

The Inquiry finished hearing evidence in March 2022.

So what have we learnt from the report so far?

Volume One: Security for the Arena

The first report released by the Inquiry, on 17 June 2021, looked into security failings on the night.

The Chairman of the public inquiry found lives may have been saved but for a series of “missed opportunities” to spot and stop suicide bomber Salman Abedi.

Although Sir John Saunders concluded it was "likely" Abedi would still have detonated his device, he added had he been identified "the loss of life and injury is highly likely to have been less."

He added that suicide bomber Abedi should have been identified as a threat on the night of the attack and a number of 'failures' by those responsible for security at Manchester Arena allowed Abedi to detonate his device killing 22.

Arena owners SMG, Showsec security guards and British Transport Police all came under fire for failing in their duty to protect the public.

Sir John cited six key ‘missed opportunities’ to save lives.

• Abedi made several trips to his hiding spot in the Arena - Abedi made a number of trips to the City Room, an area close to one of the exit doors from the Arena, to carry out “hostile reconnaissance” before he detonated his shrapnel-packed bomb.

• Abedi chose an easy spot in which to hide - SMG’s CCTV “blind spot” was also cited as the cause of “a different but connected missed opportunity” which would have spotted Abedi hiding and could have led to him being challenged earlier.

• There was no patrol of the City Room - it was Showsec workers’ practice not to check the mezzanine area where Abedi hid away from the CCTV cameras.

• Security ignored a father's concern over Abedi's rucksack - Sir John concluded this was the “most striking” missed opportunity. A member of the public, Christopher Wild, reporting Abedi to stewards 15 minutes before the explosion but was "fobbed off".

• Security 'eyeballed' Abedi eight minutes before attack - a steward passed on Mr Wild’s concerns to another Showsec steward, they both saw Abedi, who appeared to notice and looked “fidgety”.

• BTP officers were on a kebab break - British Transport Police (BTP) officers were supposed to be present in the foyer at the end of the concert, but they drove five miles to get a kebab during a two-hour meal break and were patrolling the nearby station when the bomb went off.

Volume Two: Emergency response

The second report, which was released on 3 November 2022, looked at the emergency response, and the 22 who died in the attack.

It found victims of the Arena bombing could have survived if the rescue operation had been 'better' and medical help more freely available.

They were left “waiting in vain” and “desperate for help” which did not come, Chairman Sir John Saunders said.

"Inadequacies" in the emergency response meant the deaths of two of the 22 victims could have been prevented, although, Sir John said, one with only a 'remote possibility'.

The “lack of communication” between emergency services meant paramedics and fire crews were not deployed and instead both rescuers and those injured were simply left hearing “sirens of the ambulances outside”, the report concluded.

Saffie-Rose Roussos, eight, and John Atkinson, 28, both died after suicide bomber Salman Abedi detonated a device at the end of an Ariana Grande concert in May 2017.

But, both were conscious and able to talk with medics as they were placed into ambulances and taken to hospital almost 45 minutes after the blast.

A report into the fatal consequences of the explosion found there was a 'remote possibility' the youngest victim could have been saved if the rescue operation had been conducted differently.

It also found Mr Atkinson "would probably have survived" had there not been "inadequacies" in the emergency response and he had been taken to hospital sooner.

Sir John Saunders, the chairman of the Inquiry, said he had “no doubt that lives were saved by the emergency response” and they were doing their best, but in some cases he said, “their best was not good enough”.

He added the performance of the emergency services was “far below the standard it should have been”.

Sir John Saunders also praised the “heroic acts” carried out by bystanders who ignored risks to their own safety to help the dying and the injured.

Describing the City Room as a “war zone”, he said to enter, or remain there to help those injured “required great courage”.

Volume Three: Radicalisation and preventability

The third and final report was released on 2 March 2023, and found there was a "significant missed opportunity to take action" which could have prevented the Manchester Arena terror attack.

Sir John said failures to obtain "actionable intelligence" on bomber Salman Abedi meant he was able to build a "devastatingly destructive" device for six months after watching a video posted online by Islamic State.

There were also communication breakdowns between MI5 and Counter Terrorism Police North West officers which meant intelligence was not shared.

The report, which looked at the radicalisation of Salman Abedi and the preventability of the attack, highlighted failings by the Security Service in their handling of the investigation.

It said MI5 and counter terrorism officers "underestimated" the risk posed by those travelling back from Libya.

If officers had stopped and searched Abedi as he arrived in Manchester Airport on 18 May 2017, Sir John found, there is "a real possibility" they would have found a switch used to detonate his homemade device.

Chairman Sir John has also written a closed volume three report after the inquiry held 10 days of closed hearing at an unknown location in London, involving five separate witnesses for the Security Service.

The closed report is available to MI5, Counter-Terrorism Policing and, as the minister responsible for both organisations, Home Secretary Suella Braverman.

Following the report the Director General of MI5 said he is "profoundly sorry" the Security Service did not prevent the Manchester Arena terror attack.

In response to Sir John’s findings, Ken McCallum said: "Having examined all the evidence, the chair of the Inquiry has found that 'there was a realistic possibility that actionable intelligence could have been obtained which might have led to actions preventing the attack'.

"I deeply regret that such intelligence was not obtained.

"Gathering covert intelligence is difficult – but had we managed to seize the slim chance we had, those impacted might not have experienced such appalling loss and trauma.

"I am profoundly sorry that MI5 did not prevent the attack.

"MI5 exists to stop atrocities. To all those whose lives were forever changed on that awful night, I am so sorry that MI5 did not prevent the attack at the Manchester Arena."

Head of Counter Terrorism Policing, Matt Jukes, also promised to "act quickly" on the Manchester Arena inquiry findings and insisted officers will remain "relentless in our work to keep the public safe".